We propose a new type of meet-in-the-middle attack that splits a cryptographic primitive in parallel to the execution flow of the operations. The result of the division are two primitives that have smaller input sizes and thus require lower attack complexities. The sub-primitives are not completely independent, but mutually depend on a certain number of bits. When the number of such bits is relatively small, we show a technique based on three classical meet-in-the-middle attacks that can recover the secret key of the cipher faster than an exhaustive search. We apply our findings to the lightweight block cipher Klein and show attacks on 10/11/13 rounds of Klein-64/-80/-96. We note that our approach works in the known-plaintext attack model and requires only one or two pairs of known plaintexts.
Introduction
The meet-in-the-middle attack (MITM) [4] is one of the most popular methods for analysis of block ciphers and hash functions. The MITM succeeds when the analyzed primitive can be divided into two parts, each with some independent (of the other part) input bits. More
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advanced forms of the MITM try to exploit the possible division of the primitive in the way such that the number of steps covered by the attack is as large as possible.
Common for the previous MITM methods is that they split the initial cipher (or the hash function) into two subciphers which are round-reduced versions of the initial cipher -each of the subciphers has the same state size as the cipher, and possibly a smaller key. In this work we propose different division of the cipher into subciphers. Our idea is to split the cipher into two parts that have both smaller state and smaller key sizes. For example, we may achieve this by dividing each word (or byte) of the state and of the key into two parts and then investigate the effects of the state (and key schedule) transformations on such division. When the division allows each part of the state to be updated according only to the values of the bits of that part, then we basically end up with two smaller subciphers which have twice smaller key and state sizes, and thus require much lower complexity even for a brute force attack. We call this approach the parallel-cut meet-in-the-middle attack to emphasize the fact that the division is parallel to the execution flow (see Fig. 1 ), as each transformation in the cipher is divided into two smaller transformations. In contrast, the classical MITM can be seen as a perpendicular-cut, since the division is perpendicular to the execution flow of the whole cipher.
Even with such an unorthodox division, no modern cipher allows to be split into subciphers that are completely independent as there are bits that are common for both of the subciphers. The division of the parallel-cut should be such that the number of these bits is minimal. Indeed, we show that these bits can be used to our advantage and present an approach based on three classical MITM attacks: the first and the second MITMs are used to recover the master keys of the subciphers, and the final, third MITM is used to recover the key of the initial cipher by matching the common bits between the two subciphers. Since our attack mainly consists of classical MITMs, it can work in the known-plaintext model, and has a minimal data requirement -one or a few pairs of known plaintext-ciphertext. On the other hand, similarly to the previous MITM attacks, in order to make sure that the key is recovered, our attack requires storage of the intermediate results (which are used later for matching), and thus needs a non-negligible memory.
We note that the idea of dividing a cipher into subciphers, but without any (or multiple) MITMs, has been exploited in [6, 9] . The closest idea to ours is due to Dinur et al. [5] 2-dimensional MITM on GOST -the authors showed the parallel-cut on GOST and also used several MITMs to recover the subkeys. However, they applied the attack to 8-round GOST (as part of the attack on all 32 rounds) which has completely independent subkeys, and thus they were able to use the freedom of the subkeys to achieve the recovery. Our attack is more universal as it is independent of the key schedule.
We apply the idea of parallel-cut meet-in-the-middle attack to the lightweight block cipher Klein [7] . The published analysis of this cipher is as follows. The designers have shown a 5-round integral attack with time complexity of 2 48 [7] . Aumasson et al. [1] and Yu et al. [11] have independently proposed key recovery attacks for 8-round Klein-64 by exploiting the same high probability truncated differential. Aumasson et al. have used the technique of neutral bits [2] to reduce the complexity of the attack to practical. Yu et al. also have proposed an integral attack on 7-round Klein-64 and 8-round Klein-80. Lallemand and Naya-Plasencia [8] have shown improved attacks on Klein, including a full-round attack on Klein-64 as well as improved attacks on Klein-80 and Klein-96. We point out that the previous attacks on Klein require chosen-plaintexts and need non-negligible data complexities. We show that both the key schedule and the round function of Klein can be divided into two independent parts with only a few bit guesses per round. Each such function acts only on the upper (for the first subcipher) or on the lower (for the second subcipher) parts of the bytes in Klein. This leads to a complete separation of the cipher into two independent subciphers with twice smaller key and state sizes and it allows to apply our new method. We find all the possible keys of each subcipher with two independent MITMs, and with an additional MITM we match the guessed bits, and thus recover the master key. We also show that it is possible to improve our technique in terms of memory complexity -in general these improvements are not universal, but depend on the structure of the cipher. An additional cipher specific technique given on the example of cryptanalysis of Klein is the timememory tradeoff. We note that our attacks require only one (or two, in the case of larger keys) pair of known plaintext-ciphertext 1 and result in key recoveries for 10/11/13 rounds of Klein-64/-80/-96 faster than an exhaustive search. To confirm the correctness of our findings, we have implemented the attack on 4 rounds. A comparison of the attacks on Klein is shown in Table 1 .
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe our new technique. In Section 3, we give an application of the parallel-cut MITM to the analysis of Klein. More advanced techniques, such as the partial matching technique (which allows to extend the attack for an additional round), and time-memory tradeoff are presented as well. Finally, in Section 4 we conclude the paper and propose a few open problems.
The parallel-cut MITM
The MITM attack is mostly used to recover the secret key of a cipher and to find the preimage of a hash/compression function. In both of the cases, we deal with a cryptographic primitive F (X, Y ) that has two inputs X, Y such that the input X is known to the attacker while the input Y is unknown. The MITM aims to recover the second, unknown input Y , given only a single (or only a few) pair (P , C) of one input and one output, i.e.
The standard MITM attack regards the r-round cryptographic primitive F (X, Y ) as a composition of two primitives: the first is an r 1 -round primitive F 1 (X, Y 1 ), and the second is an r 2 -round primitive When the state size is n bits, and there are k 1 independent bits in Y 1 and k 2 bits in Y 2 , the colliding set has a size of 2 k 1 +k 2 −n , and can be produced with 2 k 1 calls to F 1 , and 2 k 2 calls to F 2 . In the case when k 1 + k 2 < n, the procedure is repeated 2 n−k 1 −k 2 times.
A crucial observation in the above attack is that the primitive F is divided into two sequential parts, that is the division is perpendicular to the execution flow. Our variant of the MITM cuts the primitive in parallel to the execution flow (see Fig. 1 ) and thus the name parallel-cut MITM (PC MITM).
Let us take a closer look at this idea. We assume that we have an n-bit block cipher E K (P ) with a pair (P , C) of known plaintext-ciphertext, and we want to find the secret key K. Let G(S, K) be the round function of the cipher, where S is the input state and K is the subkey. If r is the number of rounds in the cipher, and K i are the subkeys, then the cipher can be described as S i+1 = G(S i , K i ) and S 0 = P , S r = C. Assume we can split the round function G(S i , K i ) into two smaller round functions Fig. 2 ).
That is
(1)
In other words, each of two halves of the output state, can be determined with the knowledge of one half of the input state, one half of the subkey, and a few bits from the opposite Fig. 1 The flow division in MITM attacks. The original primitive is given at the top, followed by the division used in the standard MITM attacks. At the bottom is the parallel-cut division half. If in each round of the cipher, the positions of these bits are the same, then for the whole cipher it follows that the left half of the ciphertext, can be determined from the left half of the plaintext and r ·(a 1 +b 1 ) bits that come from the opposite right half. Similar observation holds for the right half of the ciphertext, but this time the number of bits is r · (a 2 + b 2 ).
Hence we can split the whole cipher into two subciphers, with twice smaller state and key sizes, that depend additionally on some bits. Before we move further we would like to point out that the division of the state and the subkeys on left and right halves is introduced only to simplify the presentation. The division can be on any two sets, e.g. the first 10 and the last 20 bits of the state and subkeys belong to the first, while the remaining belongs to the second cipher. This division is valid 2 , as long the round transformations can produce the output in the first 10 bits and the last 20 bits only from the input specified in the first 10 and the last 20 bits and possibly a few additional bits.
If the number of guessed bits per round is zero, i.e. a i = b i = 0, i = 1, 2, then we have divided the cipher into two completely independent ciphers, thus we can easily recover the key (which is now only half of the size of the initial key) independently for each subcipher -this key recovery attack requires only 2 · 2 k 2 effort, for a cipher with k-bit key. However this is not the case for modern ciphers and there are always some unknown bits, i.e. either a i > 0, or b i > 0, or both. Further we assume that a i > 0, b i = 0, i = 1, 2 as later in the paper we deal only with such cases.
Let us see further how to use the guessing bits to our advantage. Let us focus on the first subcipher E 1 that takes as an input the left half of the plaintext, the left half of the To find the key used in this subcipher from the known pair of plaintext-ciphertext (note that if (P , C) = (P 1 ||P 2 , C 1 ||C 2 ) is the known pair for the whole cipher, then (P 1 , C 1 ) is the known pair for this subcipher), we actually apply a classical MITM attack 3 , where the independent inputs for the MITM are the guessing bits:
1. Fix a random key K for the subcipher. Obviously whenever we obtain a collision, we find a key that encrypts P 1 to C 1 with some specific guessing bits (that come from the other subcipher). The reasoning behind storing additionally the values of the guessing bits for the second subcipher will be explained later. As the size of the state is n 2 bits, it follows that for each key |A| = |B| = 2 r 2 ·b 1 , and therefore the size of the colliding set is 2
Hence the master table T 1 for all keys will have 2 k 2 +r·b 1 − n 2 entries. To produce the sets A, B for all keys of the subcipher, and thus to 3 Note that a simple exhaustive key search requires 2 k 2 +r·b 2 encryption queries, hence when r · b 2 > k 2 the exhaustive search of the subcipher has a higher complexity than the exhaustive search of the cipher. Therefore we present more advanced techniques for recovering the key of the subcipher. 4 We assume the subciphers are invertible.
create the master table T 1 , we need time complexity equivalent to 2
Next we focus on the second subcipher E 2 and perform exactly the same MITM attack, but this time we use the guessing bits from the first subcipher, i.e. the bits coming from the first subcipher are the guessing bits for the second. We create another master -bit key, r · b 1 (resp. r · b 2 ) guesses for the incoming (resp. outcoming) bits, and r · b 2 (resp. r · b 1 ) guesses for outcoming (resp. incoming) bits. The final step of the key recovery attack for the whole cipher E is to find collisions between the master tables T 1 , T 2 on the guesses. As there are r · (b 1 + b 2 ) guesses, we will end up with
possible keys 5 . If k > n we will need only a few additional plaintext-ciphertext pairs to find the real key. In general, the above PC MITM can be described as:
1. Split the cipher E into two subciphers E 1 , E 2 such that each subcipher depends on as less as possible bits of the other subcipher. 2. For each of the subciphers, using the classical MITM, recover the key under all possible values of the guessing bits that come from the other subcipher. 3. For each pair of recovered keys of the first and the second subcipher, check if the guessing bits correspond -use another MITM to perform this procedure.
The success of the PC MITM, in particular the number of rounds that can be attacked, depends on how well the (round-reduced) cipher allows division into subciphers with minimal bit guesses per round. This on the other hand is related to the round diffusion, but a strong diffusion not necessarily leads to a high resistance against the PC MITM. For example, a hypothetical 64-bit cipher that has only modular additions, XORs, and rotations on 32 bits can achieve a full diffusion in one-two rounds, however it can be attacked easily with PC MITM as for each addition only 1 bit coming from the lower half has to be guessed. In the sequel we present a PC MITM attack on Klein. Let X be an s-byte vector, i.e. X = (X[0] Note that only the MixNibbles step is byte-oriented, whereas the other three operations are nibble-oriented. After the last round, another subkey is XORed to the state. The MixNibbles operation is the diffusion layer and consists of two instances of the AES operation MixColumns which can be expressed as a matrix multiplication in the finite field GF 2 8 
The two MixColumns are applied to the two parts of the state: the first 4 bytes and the last four bytes. The key schedule of Klein is as follows. First, the master key denoted as K 0 , is split into t bytes are rotated independently, i.e. both 
Application of a Feistel-like transformation on the left and on the right halves of
K i−1 , i.e. K 0 i = K 1 i−1 and K 1 i = K 0 i−1 ⊕ K 1 i−1 .
XOR of the round counter i (one byte) to the third byte of
4. Application of four S-boxes to the four nibbles of the second and of the third bytes of
, where S[·] stands for the 4-bit Sbox. After each round of the key schedule, the 64 most significant bits of K i−1 are used as a subkey in the i-th round of the encryption.
The parallel-cut division of Klein
From the specification of Klein, we can see that the key schedule, AddRoundKey, SubNibbles and RotateNibbles are nibble-oriented and do not provide diffusion between the higher and lower nibbles within the bytes of the state 7 . We call the byte transformation
T (X) nibble-separable, if it can be expressed as T (X) = T H (X H )||T L (X L ), where T H (Y ), T L (Y )
are nibble transformations. The nibble-separation allows to launch the PC MITM. If there were no MixNibbles operations in Klein, the higher and lower nibbles would never mix and the cipher could be completely divided into two independent subciphers. Thus let us focus on the MixColumn operation used in MixNibbles of Klein and let us find how strong is the diffusion between the higher and the lower nibbles.
Observation 1 The operation MixColumn is nibble-separable with an additional dependency on 4 MSB inputs from the opposite halves, i.e. for an input v, MixColumns(v)= MixColumns(v) H ||MixColumns(v) L , where
MixColumn(v) H = MixColumn H (v H , MSB(v L )), MixColumn(v) L = MixColumn L (v L , MSB(v H )).
Moreover, the entropy introduced by the MSBs is only 3 bits.
The above observation claims that MixColumns is almost nibble-separable, and the higher (resp. lower) output nibbles can be computed from the higher (resp. lower) input nibbles and only four additional most significant bits of the lower (resp. higher) nibbles.
Moreover, 4 MSBs introduce only 3-bit entropy (instead of 4-bit entropy).
Proof First let us rewrite (3) as:
00 01 01 01 01 00 01 01 01 01 00 01 01 01 01 00
Obviously, a multiplication by the constant 01 is nibble-separable, hence the multiplication by 0−1 matrix in the right side is nibble-separable. Further, let us focus on the multiplication by 02 in the finite field used in MixColumn. Let x and y be two elements of the finite field such that y = 02 · x. The relation between x and y, expressed bitwisely, is:
Thus it follows that y L = y 3 ||y 2 ||y 1 ||y 0 can be computed from 
Although there are four free bits v[i] 7 , i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} at the input, MSB H has only 2 3 possible values. This comes from the fact that the rank of the binary matrix M in (6) is only 3, which results in a range space of size 2 3 . Thus the four bits of MSB H are linearly dependent and each bit can be computed from the other three. Similar property holds too for the higher nibbles w H and v H .
We can conclude that in order to perform the computation of the higher and lower nibbles through MixColumn, we only need the values of 4 bits from the other half and they can take 2 3 possible values. The parallel-cut division of Klein is as follows. 
Lemma 1 The r-round 64-bit cipher
Proof The key schedule is nibble-separable, thus all the higher (resp. lower) nibbles of all the subkeys can be determined from K H (resp. K L ). Similarly, all the transformations besides MixNibbles, are nibble-separable as well. In one application of MixNibbles, there are two MixColumns. According to the Observation 1, the computation of the higher (resp. lower) nibbles of one MixColumn requires 3-bit extra information of the MSBs from the lower (resp. higher) nibbles, and therefore the whole MixNibbles requires 6 bits. Thus, for r-round Klein, the size of the required additional information msb L (resp. msb H ) is 6r bits.
With the notations from Section 2, the parallel-cut division of Klein has the following parameter values:
, n = 64 and k ∈ {64, 80, 96}.
Attack algorithm and its improvements
Once we know the parameters of the division, the generic parallel-cut MITM attack introduced in Section 2 can be applied to Klein. The attack algorithms are the same for all versions of Klein. The outline of the attack is shown in Fig. 4 . According to the formula for the complexity, the attack on r-round Klein (r is even) with k-bit key requires at most 
Partial matching technique
In the attack on even number of rounds, we compute the lower/higher nibbles of the middle state in both directions as the matching point. In fact, we could skip the guessing of MSBs in one round and apply the technique of partial matching. It is based on the fact that even if the MSB values are unknown, we could still determine certain bits at the output of the MixNibbles operation.
For the lower nibbles in (5), i.e. the case of multiplication by 02, if the values of  (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) are known, we could determine the value of the following three bits of y:
(y 1 + y 0 , y 2 , y 3 + y 0 ) = (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 ) .
, where i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, or in total 3 · 4 = 12 bits.
Due to the linear relation of the MSBs of v H , there is another bit that can be determined too. Consider the values of the least significant bits in w L , i.e.
They can be expressed through the bits of v as follows:
Therefore, the value
be determined without the knowledge of v H . Similarly, for the higher nibbles, the equation takes the form:
Again
, thus it can be determined without the knowledge of v L . As a result, we can determine the values of 3 × 4 + 1 = 13 bits of w L (resp. w H ) only from the value of lower (resp. higher) nibbles of the input v L (resp. v H ).
An Attack on the odd number of rounds Using the above partial matching technique, we can skip one round in both of the first two MITMs (recall that the PC MITM uses three distinct MITMs). Therefore, the computational complexity of one direction can be reduced by a factor of 2 6 and the size of the matching point can be reduced from 32 bits to 13 × 2 = 26 bits (2 13 bits for one MixColumn). The expected number of matches 2 6r−6−26 = 2 6r−32 in the MITMs is not affected since the size of matching sets and the size of the filter are both reduced by a factor of 2 6 .
The complexity of the attack on even number of rounds cannot be reduced using this technique, as we are able to apply the reduction only in one round and, more importantly, in one direction of the MITM -the second MITM would remain the same thus the combined complexity would stay intact. On the other hand, for the attack on odd number r of rounds, the complexity can be reduced. We split the cipher with The complexity of the attack on even number of rounds, per half key K L , is 2 3r . Hence a unified expression for the complexity on both even and odd r would be 2 6 r 2 . As a result, the total complexity of our attack on r-round Klein becomes 2 A time-memory trade-off Further we show that the time and memory requirements of our attacks are flexible to a certain extent, i.e. we can reduce the memory requirement while increasing the time complexity of the first two MITMs. The idea is to choose and fix the MSBs of the nibbles in the first t rounds. Since we need 12 bit guesses per round, the whole attack (the three MITMs) will be repeated 2 12t times to find all the filtered keys.
Before we choose the values of the MSBs, a precomputation is needed. For all 2 k 2 K L and K H , we compute the values of the MSBs in round t + 1 using the guessed MSBs in round 1 to round t and build a lookup table. Once a 12t-bit value of the MSBs is fixed, we can directly find about 2 k 2 −6t corresponding half keys by indexing the 6t-bit MSB value in round t + 1.
For a chosen value of the MSBs in the first t rounds and all the 2 k 2 −6t corresponding keys, the first two MITMs are now on r − t rounds, thus require 2 
Final results
The round functions for all three versions of Klein are identical, thus the technique from Section 3.4 can be applied to all of them. In the formulas for the complexities, when the parameter t changes, it affects the time and the memory complexities only of the first level MITMs (i.e. the MITMs on the lower and the higher halves). When t increases, the first level MITMs require more time and less memory. In order to find the best attacks in terms of maximal number of rounds, first we find the largest attackable number of rounds with t = 0. Then we compare the computational costs of the first and second level MITMs. If the first level MITMs require more time complexity than the second level MITM, then the memory cannot be reduced while maintaining the same number of rounds. Otherwise, the time complexity would increase, making the attack worse than the simple exhaustive key search. However, when the second level MITM is more costly, then we can try to find the value for the parameter t to reduce the memory requirement of our attack. The final results are as follows.
For Klein-64, we can attack 10 out of 12 rounds. The parameters for the attack are k = 64, r = 10 and t = 0. The complexity is T (64, 10, 0) = 2 62 time and M(64, 10, 0) = 2 60 memory. For Klein-80, we can attack 11 out of 16 rounds. The optimal parameters for the attack are k = 80, r = 11 and t = 0. The complexity is T (80, 11, 0) = 2 74 time and M(80, 11, 0) = 2 74 memory. For Klein-96, we can attack 13 out of 20 rounds and apply the time-memory tradeoff to reduce the memory requirement without increasing the time complexity. This comes from the fact that the time complexity increases only in the first two MITMs, but not in the third. Thus the optimal parameters for the attack are k = 96, r = 13 and t = 2. The complexity is T (96, 13, 2) = 2 94 time and M(96, 13, 2) = 2 82 memory.
In order to confirm the correctness of our approach, we have implemented the attack on 4-round Klein-64 -it takes 2 44 computations and 2 24 memory. We have set the plaintext and ciphertext to all-zero vectors and successfully recovered the 64-bit key. The result is given in Table 2 .
Conclusion
We have proposed a new type of meet-in-the-middle attack which splits the cipher along the execution flow in a way such that the produced subciphers have smaller sizes and mutually depend only on a few bits. We have applied this novel technique to the lightweight block cipher Klein, and we have shown that the cipher can be divided into two smaller ciphers with only 6 exchanged bits per round. Then, two MITM attacks have been used to attack the two independent parts, and one final MITM to connect them. This has resulted in attacks on 10 rounds for Klein-64, 11 rounds for Klein-80, and 13 rounds for Klein-96. Our attacks are not the best in terms of the number of penetrated rounds. The analysis, however, has one big advantage -the data requirement is practical. To recover the whole key we need only one or two pairs of known plaintext-ciphertext (the information theoretic minimum). Thus our approach (as well as other MITM-based attacks) tackles one of the main problems of applied cryptanalysis, which is a scarce data, and can work in practical scenarios where the amount of data is limited and not chosen by the attacker. The three-step (three MITMs) approach we use in the PC MITM is our own way of taking advantage of the exchanged bits produced after the parallel-cut division. However, by no means it should be considered that this is the only way, and possibly some MITMs can be avoided. In particular, when the number of exchanged bits is relatively small, and when the target is to find preimages for hash functions (rather than to recover the key), it might be beneficial first to fix the exchanged bits, and then to search for preimages in the smaller size hash functions. Also, it is not required to divide the initial cipher into two subciphers that necessary have the same state/key sizes. Rather, the division should be such that the number of exchanged bits between the ciphers is equal which would result in balanced complexity of the first two MITMs.
We would like to point out two open problems, solution of which could lead to improvements of the complexity of the PC MITM. The first is related to the memory requirement of our approach. Although MITM attacks in general have a memoryless variant, in the case (as ours) when one needs to find not one but all the matches, the proposed approach from [10] cannot be applied. Intuitively, it seems such memoryless MITM for n-bit function cannot be achieved when the time complexity is bounded by 2 n -otherwise one has to be sure that in the Floyd cycle finding algorithm, the starting vertex for each separate collision is at a different path that leads to a cycle. A formal proof, either confirming or disapproving our conjecture, would contribute significantly to the field of cryptography. The second open problem is related to the way we perform the PC MITM attack -first we match separately in the middle of the lower/higher nibble states, and then we match on the guessed bits. In general this can be seen as a problem of finding partial pair collisions between four functionseach with two inputs and two outputs. The functions are coupled in pairs, and each pair has one general independent input and one input coming from a function of the other pair. The problem consists in finding the two independent inputs that produce collisions at the second output of each pair. We have solved the problem by guessing the exchanged inputs between the pairs, generating all independent inputs, and finally matching the guesses. A better solution in terms of time/memory complexity, exploiting simultaneously the dependency between the inputs and outputs, may exist.
